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Rule and Going Back to the Supreme Court's
Drawing Board
Cheryl Ryon Eison*
In response to the revelation of various election abuses during the
Watergate investigations,' many state and local legislative bodies, as
well as Congress, began increasing restrictions on election campaign
financing. Among the most controversial regulations are those limiting
the dollar amounts of contributions by individual citizens to a single
political committee in a referendum campaign. Two recent decisions
testing the validity of such laws under the first amendment, one by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Let's Help Florida v. McCrary,2 and
another by the Supreme Court of California in Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley,' make it apparent that the United States
Supreme Court must review, clarify, and extend the law it developed in
the 1970s in response to first amendment challenges to campaign con-
tribution and expenditure limitations, especially in Buckley v. Valeo4
and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.5
* B.A.E., J.D. University of Florida, 1970, 1974. Associate Professor of Law,
Nova University Center for the Study of Law.
1. For an historical overview of the development of federal election campaign
finance investigation and regulation, including examples of abuses revealed during the
Watergate investigations, see Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 835-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
2. 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-970 (U.S. Dec. 8,
1980).
3. 27 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980), appeal docketed, No.
80-737 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1980).
4. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding against first amendment attack the Federal
Election Campaign Act's limitation on contributions to candidates for federal office,
but invalidating restrictions on expenditures by or on behalf of candidates).
5. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (overturning a Massachusetts statute insofar as it pro-
hibited corporations from making any contribution or expenditure to influence the vote
1
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THE RECENT CASES
Let's Help Florida v. McCrary
This case was one of several 6 arising out of a 1978 initiative cam-
paign for a state constitutional amendment to allow casino gambling in
a defined area of South Florida. Let's Help Florida, a political commit-
tee, challenged a Florida statute which imposed a $3,000 limitation on
persons making contributions to a political committee supporting or op-
posing a statewide referendum issue. The district court declared the
statute unconstitutional.8 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peal, the case was consolidated with Dade Voters for a Free Choice v.
Firestone,9 wherein a Florida lawO0 placing a $1,000 ceiling on contri-
butions to political committees organized in connection with county-
wide referendum elections was found invalid.
After disposing of several issues of federal jurisdiction and re-
view,"" the court addressed appellants' substantive arguments: that the
statutes should be upheld as (1) aiding in the prevention of political
corruption and (2) promoting disclosure about who are the supporters
of referendum campaigns. Responding to the anti-corruption argument,
the court determined that
[t]he state's interest in preventing the actual or apparent corruption of
on referendum measures).
6. See, e.g., Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Fla., 363 So. 2d
337 (Fla. 1978), Let's Help Fla. v. Smathers, 360 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978); Let's Help Fla. v. Smathers, 360 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
7. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(d) (1977). This provision was part of a comprehensive
election code enacted by the Florida Legislature in 1977 to become effective January 1,
1978. The code did not restrict the number of contributions one could make to different
political committees or the total amount of one's independent direct expenditures. FLA.
STAT. § 106.011(5) (1977).
8. 453 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Fla. 1978).
9. No. 79-770 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 1979). Dade Voters for a Free Choice was a
political committee formed to oppose the passage of a county ordinance which would
prohibit smoking in public places.
10. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(e) (1977).
11. The court rejected the contentions of the appellants in Dade Voters that the
district court (1) lacked jurisdiction because no case or controversy existed; (2) should
have abstained from hearing the case under the Younger abstention doctrine; and (3)
should not have granted injunctive relief. 621 F.2d at 198-99.
1422 5:1981 1
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candidates, which the Supreme Court found so compelling in Buckley
fv. Valeol2], does not justify restrictions upon political contributions in
referendum elections. . . . Large contributions for publicity by one
group or another do not influence the political decisionmakers-in this
case, the voters themselves-except in a manner protected by the first
amendment.13
The court also noted that the Supreme Court in First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellottil4 had distinguished between candidacy and refer-
endum elections in terms of risk of corruption, concluding that the risk
"simply is not present" 15 in the referendum context. Similarly, the
court rejected appellant's argument that the contribution limitations
promoted disclosure, although it recognized that disclosing campaign
contributions serves an important state interest.' 6 The court wrote:
Florida can and does effectively promote the disclosure of large contribu-
tions through measures that are less harmful to first amendment rights
[than imposing contribution limitations]. For example, . . . the Florida
Election Code [requires] political committees to register with the state
and to file information about each contribution and contributor through-
out the campaign. This information is available to the public .... 17
In short, because the contribution limitations added nothing new to the
existing disclosure laws to make them more effective, they could not be
defended as disclosure measures. Since the statutes did not serve the
purpose of preventing political corruption or of promoting disclosure,
the district court's decisions, invalidating the acts as abridging im-
portant first amendment rights, were affirmed by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeal.
12. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). For a more detailed analysis of this case, see text accom-
panying notes 33-42 infra.
13. 621 F.2d at 199-200 (emphasis supplied).
14. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). For a more detailed analysis of this case, see text ac-
companying notes 43-52 infra.
15. Id. at 790.
16. 621 F.2d at 200.
17. Id. at 200-01.
423[1
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Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley
In this case the Supreme Court of California overturned a Califor-
nia Court of Appeal decision 18 invalidating a Berkeley city ordinance19
imposing a $250.00 maximum on contributions in support of or in op-
position to a ballot measure.20
Like the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Let's Help Florida, the
Supreme Court of California examined the ordinance in light of its
proposed effectiveness in preventing corruption and promoting disclo-
sure. Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the California court perceived the
Berkeley ordinance as both necessary and effective in achieving those
objectives. Viewing the corruption to be guarded against not as the cor-
ruption of persons but as the corruption of the initiative and referen-
dum mechanisms, the Court reasoned:
[T]he domination of these processes by large contributors leaves other
citizens with a stilled voice in the very domain of our electoral system set
aside for accomplishing the popular will .... When large contributors
use the power of their purse to overcome the power of reason, they
thwart the intended purpose of the initiative or referendum: instead of
fostering participation by a greater segment of the electorate, the vision
of direct democracy is transformed into a tool of narrow interests.2 1
The court also observed that "the electoral process is. . . corrupted by
such contributions because voters lose confidence in our governmental
system if they come to believe that only the power of money makes the
difference."22 And it accepted the contribution limitations as a means
of promoting disclosure: although section 112 of the Berkeley ordinance
required the city to publish in newspapers a list of all contributors
making donations of more than fifty dollars to candidates or commit-
18. 99 Cal. App. 3d 736, 160 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
19. Berkeley, Cal., Election Reform Act of 1974, § 602, as cited in 27 Cal. 3d at
_, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
20. The term "ballot measure" is synonymous with the term "referendum issue"
and is so-used throughout this article.
21. 27 Cal. 3d at _, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (footnote omitted)
(citing CROUCH et al., CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 108 (3d ed. 1964) and
Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo; The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 323, 330 (1977).
22. 27 Cal. 3d at ., 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
Nova Law Journal
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tees at least twice during the last seven days of a campaign,23 the court
was concerned that "the campaign propaganda and the identification
[of donors] are not simultaneous: inducements are disseminated and
voter impressions are formed substantially before the sources of com-
mittee financing are revealed. 12 '
Having embraced the corruption and disclosure arguments to es-
tablish a compelling state interest in imposing contribution limitations,
the Supreme Court of California rejected the notion that countervailing
first amendment freedoms of expression and association were being im-
permissibly abridged. 25 The court distinguished First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellott 26 which was relied upon by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal in Let's Help Florida as establishing a distinction between per-
missible limitations on contributions to candidates and impermissible
ceilings on contributions to referendum campaigns on the basis of po-
tential for corruption. The California court simply noted that "[t]he
statute at issue in Bellotti totally prohibited. . . expenditures and con-
tributions; the Berkeley ordinance ...permits contributions ...in
amounts up to $250."28 Thus, the court not only rejected the candi-
dacy/referendum reading of Bellotti in Let's Help Florida but further
determined that expression and association were not being completely,
and therefore impermissibly, repressed, but merely permissibly regu-
lated in the public interest.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of California found the compelling
state interests of preventing corruption and promoting disclosure were
served by the Berkeley ordinance in a reasonable manner.29 The district
23. Id. at .., 614 P.2d at 753, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
24. Id. at _, 614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91. Though the Florida disclo-
sure statute found by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to be more effective than
contributions limititations in Let's Help Fla. (FLA. STAT. §§ 106.03,.07 (1977)) did not
require publication of the names of contributors, political committees were required to
file contribution and expenditure reports quarterly from the time the campaign trea-
surer was appointed and, following the last day for qualifying for office, either weekly
or bi-weekly depending on the scope of the election in question (statewide vs. non-
statewide). Id. § 106.07(1).
25. 27 Cal. 3d at ., 614 P.2d at 748-49, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91.
26. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
27. 621 F.2d at 200.
28. 27 Cal. 3d at , 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
29. The court rejected the argument that the $250 ceiling was too low: "The
425[1
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court decision invalidating the measure was reversed, four to three."0
THE BACKGROUND: BUCKLEY AND BELLOTTI
The Supreme Court predicate for the Let's Help Florida and
Berkeley decisions provides no ready answer as to which court, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of California, has
decided correctly the validity of limitations on contributions to referen-
dum political committees. A brief review of Buckley v. Valeos1 and
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,3 2 relied upon by both courts
in reaching their opposite conclusions, will show the complexity of the
issue and the potential for confusion and conflict created by the Su-
preme Court in those decisions.
Buckley v. Valeo
The Supreme Court opinion in this 1976 case has since been the
point of departure for analysis of the validity of a variety of federal,
state, and local campaign finance regulations. At issue in Buckley were
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,13 limiting (1)
contributions by individuals or groups to candidates for federal elective
office" and contributions to any such candidates by political commit-
tees 5 and (2) expenditures by individuals or groups advocating the
election or defeat of such candidates8 as well as expenditures by the
major proportion of CARC's [Citizens Against Rent Control] funds came in amounts
under the ceiling; moreover, the few contributions that were larger were considerably
above the ceiling and hence would not have been aided by a modest upward adjust-
ment." Id. at -, 614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
30. Justice Richardson wrote a cogent and convincing dissenting opinion, Id. at
_, 614 P.2d at 750-55, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 92-97, with which Justices Clark and Manuel
concurred.
31. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
32. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
33. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3, as amended by the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (imposing a $1,000 limit).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (imposing a $5,000 limit). A
$25,000 limitation on total contributions by any contributor (individual, group, or polit-
ical committee) (18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) was also contested.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (imposing a $1,000 limit).
1 426 Nova Law Journal 5:1981 1
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candidates themselves 7 and their own campaign organizations.3 8 The
reporting and disclosure requirements of the Ac 9 were also
contested.40
The Court held that the contribution limitations at issue were not
unconstitutional but were supported by substantial governmental inter-
ests in limiting corruption and the appearance of corruption in federal
elections.4 1 As to the expenditure limitations, the Court found these
unconstitutional as impermissible burdens on the right of free expres-
sion under the first amendment which could not be sustained on the
basis of governmental interests in preventing the actuality or appear-
ance of corruption or in equalizing the resources of candidates. 2
Thus, a cursory reading of Buckley would dictate acceptance of
the Supreme Court of California's view in Berkeley that the city ordi-
nance was not invalid because it was a contribution limitation, not an
expenditure limitation, and contribution limitations prevent corruption.
But an examination of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti leads
37. 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (dollar limit depending on
office involved).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (dollar limit depending on office
involved).
39. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq. (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (requiring political commit-
tees to report to the Federal Election Commission the names of persons contributing
more than $10, with the names of those contributing more than $100 in a calendar
year being subject to public inspection) and 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) (1970 & Supp. IV.
1974) (requiring every person or group other than a political committee or candidate
who makes political contributions or expenditures exceeding $100 in a calendar year,
other than by contribution to a political committee or candidate, to file a statement
with the Federal Election Commission).
40. Two other principal holdings in Buckley are not relevant here: (1) that the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code for public financing of presidential election
campaigns were not unconstitutional as being contrary to the art. I, sec. 8 general
welfare clause or the first or fifth amendments or as invidiously discriminating against
minority parties or their candidates or candidates not running in party primaries, 424
U.S. at 85-109; (2) that the principle of separation of powers contained in the art. I,
sec. I appointments clause was violated by the method of appointment of the members
of the Federal Election Commission considering its rule making, adjudicatory and en-
forcement powers (though de facto validity would be given to the Commission's past
acts), 424 U.S. at 109-143.
41. Id. at 58.
42. Id. at 58-59. The Court also decided that the reporting and disclosure re-
quirements were valid. Id. at 84.
427 1
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to the conclusion that a less superficial analysis of Buckley will be re-
quired to resolve the question of the validity of limitations on contribu-
tions to political committees in referendum campaigns.
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
Although Let's Help Florida and Berkeley were, like Buckley,
contribution cases, Bellotti was a 1978 expenditure case. Unlike Buck-
ley, Bellotti was a referendum case, not a candidacy case. The Massa-
chusetts statute at issue prohibited corporations from making contribu-
tions or expenditures "for the purpose of. . . influencing or affecting
the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materi-
ally affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corpora-
tion."' 43 The law further provided that "[n]o question submitted to the
voters solely concerning the taxation of the income . . . of individuals
shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of
the corporation."" The appellants, two national banks and three busi-
ness corporations, wanted to spend money to publicize their opposition
to a proposed state constitutional amendment to allow the legislature to
impose a personal income tax.
Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had
concerned itself principally with the question of whether and to what
extent corporations have first amendment rights,45 the Supreme Court
took a less subjective approach:
We believe that the court posed the wrong question. The Constitution
often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking their vin-
43. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977). In addition to
prohibiting corporate contributions or expenditures for the purpose of influencing the
vote on referenda, section 8 proscribed contributions and expenditures in candidacy
elections.
The importance of the governmental interest in preventing [corruption of elected
representatives through the creation of political debts in candidacy elections] has
never been doubted. The case before us presents no comparable problem, and our
consideration of a corporation's right to speak on issues of general public interest
implies no comparable right in the quite different context of participation in a
political campaign for election to public office.
435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
44. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977).
45. 371 Mass. 773, 359 N.E.2d 1262 (1977).
8
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dication. The First Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal
interests. The proper question therefore is not whether corporations
"have" First Amendment rights . . Instead, the question must be
whether [the statute] abridges expression that the First Amendment was
meant to protect.' 6
The Court was quick to determine that "[t]he speech proposed by ap-
pellants is at the heart of the First Amendment's protection"' and
"[i]f the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest
that the State could silence their proposed speech."' 48
The state advanced as one of its principal justifications for the pro-
hibition of corporate speech in the referendum context "the State's in-
terest in sustaining the active role of the individual citizen in the electo-
ral process and thereby preventing diminution of the citizen's
confidence in government."'49 Pointing out that the state could prevail
with this argument only upon showing it to represent a compelling sub-
ordinating interest in regulating protected speech in pursuit of which a
method "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement" of the right
to engage in that speech had been used,50 the Court noted that the
State's assertion that there is danger in allowing corporate participation
in the discussion of a referendum issue rested upon the unsupported
assumption that "such participation would exert an undue influence on
the outcome of a referendum vote and-in the end-destroy the confi-
dence of the people in the democratic process and the integrity of
governnment."'51 The Court concluded:
46. 435 U.S. at 776.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 777.
49. Id. at 787. The state also asserted a compelling interest in protecting the
rights of corporate shareholders whose views were different from those expressed by the
management on behalf of the corporation. The Court concluded that "[a]ssuming, ar-
guendo, that protection of shareholders is a 'compelling' interest under the circum-
stances of this case, we find 'no substantially relevant correlation between the govern-
mental interest asserted and the State's effort' to prohibit appellants from speaking"
considering the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of the statute. Id. at 795
(quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960)).
50. 435 U.S. at 786 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 25).
51. 435 U.S. at 789.
429 1
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If appellee's arguments were supported by record or legislative findings
that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic
processes . . ., these arguments would merit our consideration. . . .But
there has been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has
been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massa-
chusetts, or that there has been any threat to the confidence of the citi-
zenry in government.
Nor are appellee's arguments inherently persuasive or supported by
the precedents of this Court. Referenda are held on issues, not candi-
dates for public office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving
candidate elections. . . simply is not present in a popular vote on a pub-
lic issue. To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of
the vote. . . .But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is
hardly a reason to suppress it: The Constitution "protects expression
which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing. . . ." We
noted only recently that "the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. . . ." Buckley,
supra, at 48-49. Moreover, the people . ..are entrusted with the re-
sponsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting
arguments. They may consider . . the source and creditibility of the
advocate.52
Thus, the Court relied not so much on the fact that an expenditur was
at issue but rather emphasized that it-was a referendum and not a
candidacy election, that was at stake. This was certainly the Fifth Cir-
cuit's reading of Bellotti in Let's Help Florida.
SYNTHESIS: BUCKLEY, BELLOTTI, LET'S HELP FLORIDA,
BERKELEY
The principal cases indicate that the questions which must be an-
swered in determining the validity of limitations on contributions to po-
litical committees supporting or opposing ballot measures are these:
(1) For the purpose of first amendment protection, is a contribu-
tion to a referendum political committee political expression or merely
a manifestation of political association?
(2) What state interests, if any, are sufficiently compelling to with-
52. Id. at 789-92 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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stand the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny of laws infringing on first
amendment rights by imposing ceilings on contributions to referendum
political committees?
(3) Assuming a compelling state interest in monitoring referen-
dum campaigns, are limitations on contributions to political committees
the most effective and least restrictive means of serving such an
interest?
1. Is a Contribution to a Referendum Political Committee "Po-
litical Expression" or "Political Association?"
Both political expression5" and political association54 are forms of
"speech" protected by the first amendment. But what the Supreme
Court in Buckley saw as the symbolic nature of a campaign contribu-
tion,55 as opposed to a direct expenditure of money to express one's
views (for example, purchasing newspaper space for a political adver-
tisement), seems somehow to diminish the "political expression" aspect
of such contributions. That is not to say that "the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce
53. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candi-
dates are integral to the operation of the system of government established
by our Constitution. The first amendment affords the broadest protection
to such political expression in order "to assure [the] unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 ... (1957)....
"[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs
.... " Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
54. The First Amendment protects political association as well as political
expression. The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), stemmed from the Court's recogni-
tion that "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group associa-
tion." Subsequent decisions have made clear that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee "'freedom to associate with others for the com-
mon advancement of political beliefs and ideas,"'.... Kusper v. Pon-
tikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56, 57 (1973), quoted in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S.
477, 487 (1975).
Id. at 15.
55. Id. at 21.
431115:1981
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a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the
First Amendment," 56 but
[a] limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate
or campaign organization . . . involves little direct restraint on his politi-
cal communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evi-
denced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe [upon] the
contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.57
Thus, according to Buckley, contribution "speech" partakes more of
freedom of association than of freedom of expression in first amend-
ment analysis: "the primary First Amendment problem raised by...
contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the contrib-
utor's freedom of political association."58 And though measures cur-
tailing the freedom to associate demand the closest scrutiny, 59 "[e]ven
a 'significant intereference' with protected rights of political associa-
tion" may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently impor-
tant interest . . .60
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that although both political
expression and political association are fundamental rights, contribu-
tions to referendum political committees will fare better for the purpose
of first amendment protection if such contributions are seen primarily
as a non-symbolic form of political expression. Indeed, in Buckley limi-
tations on symbolic, associational campaign contributions were sus-
tained but limitations on campaign expenditures, described as "limita-
tions on core First Amendment rights of political expression," 1 were
declared invalid.
Should contributions to referendum political committees be char-
acterized primarily as political expression for first amendment pur-
poses? In a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal case, California
56. Id. at 16.
57. Id. at 21.
58. Id. at 24-25.
59. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
60. 424 U.S. at 25 (citing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975),
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963), and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960)).
61. 424 U.S. at 44-45.
5:19811
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Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission,62 (hereinafter
CMA) Judge Wallace, dissenting, found contributions to multi-candi-
date political committees more analagous to campaign expenditures
(expression) than to campaign contributions (association) 3 for reasons
which are analytically applicable in the referendum political committee
context. At issue in CMA was the constitutionality of limits on contri-
butions to political action committees" under the Federal Election
Campaign Act as amended in 1976."After the Supreme Court upheld
the Act's $1,000 limitation on individual's contributions to candidates
for federal office in Buckley, Congress, "as a matter of legislative
grace,. . . opened a wider avenue by which individuals could channel
funds to candidates: any person, including both natural persons and va-
rious kinds of organizations, could contribute up to $5,000 to multi-
candidate political committees which in turn could contribute up to
$5,000 to each candidate."66 In CMA, CALPAC was a multi-candi-
date political committee affiliated with the California Medical
Association.
Comparing the expression and association interests affected by the
contribution limitations sustained in Buckley with those affected by the
Act's limitation on contributions to political committees, Judge Wal-
lace found the latter to be "more substantial":67
In Buckley the contribution limitations governed contributions from a
supporter to a candidate. The communication inhering in such contribu-
62. No. 79-4426 (9th Cir. May 23, 1980), appeal docketed, No. 79-1952, (U.S.
June 12, 1980).
63. No. 79-4426, slip op. at 3405.
64. The phrase "political action committee" may be of indeterminate ori-
gin, but it appears to have gained currency by 1944 when it was used as a
term of art by the Congressional Special Committees to Investigate Cam-
paign Expenditures, H.R. REP. No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); S.
REP. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). It now has a meaning fixed by
federal law. 2 U.S.C. § 44Ia(a)(4) (1976).
Kiley, Pacing The Burger Court: The Corporate Right to Speak and the Public Right
to Hear After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 427, 428 n.6 (1980).
65. Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (_). The $5,000 limitation on contributions
to political committees was codified as 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (1976).
66. No. 79-4426, slip op. at 3375 (footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 3404.
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tions is simply that the contributor "supports" the candidate and his
views. The Court found that this "symbolic expression of support"...
is adequately communicated by the act of contribution: the contribu-
tion's size is of "marginal" importance ...
In contrast ..... .[t]he object of an unincorporated association's
donations to a political committee is not merely to indicate "support" for
the committee's views, but to use the instrument of a political action
committee to voice its own ideas. Whereas in Buckley [where the contri-
butions were to the candidates themselves] "the transformation of contri-
butions into political debate [involved] speech by someone other than the
contributor," . . . here this transformation is accomplished by the com-
mittee donors themselves, through a committee which, in large or small
measure, they control.68
Judge Wallace went on to point out that a limitation on donations
to political committees ultimately affects not only the total funds avail-
able for contributions to candidates, but also the amount available for
direct expenditure by the committee:6 9
It is by repeatedly forgetting this incontestable fact that the major-
ity erroneously likens the . . . donation restriction to the contribution
limitations upheld in Buckley. [The Act] imposes [quoting Buckley] "di-
rect and substantial restraints on the quantity" of . . . "political
speech.". . . The individual speech interests are therefore comparable to
those affected by the expenditure limitations invalidated in Buckley.70
It may be argued here that the "limitation on funds available for
expenditure" rationale should be de-emphasized because, since Buck-
ley, campaign contributors remain free to make their own direct ex-
penditures in any amount they choose. However, freedom of association
is implicated here:
Only in conjunction with outside donors will some unincorporated as-
sociations be able to aggregate sufficient funds and expertise to compete
effectively in the political marketplace with other more affluent "per-
sons" capable of huge personal expenditures. . . . [This] restriction . ..
68. Id. (citation omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 3404-05 (footnote and citation omitted).
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goes to the heart of the associational right."'
Whatever criticisms or distinctions can be raised in opposition to
Judge Wallace's dissenting opinion in CMA considering the potential
for corruption in the candidacy context,7 2 the opinion is well-tailored to
make the point that contributions by individuals to referendum political
committees should be treated as direct expenditures, as pure speech
political expression, for first amendment purposes. Paraphrasing Judge
Wright,"3 the object of an individual citizen's donation to a political
committee is not merely to indicate support for or opposition to the
committee's views on a ballot measure, but to use the political commit-
tee to voice his or her own ideas. Although an individual contributor
does not have complete control over the precise "speech" which will
emanate from the political committee regarding the ballot measure in
question, the issue to be spoken to is clearly established in advance of
the donation, as well as the position being supported by the committee,
positive or negative. Although such contributors are clearly free to di-
rectly expend as much money as they are willing and able in favor of
or in opposition to a referendum issue, again paraphrasing Judge Wal-
lace,74 only in conjunction with other donors will some citizens be able
to aggregate sufficient funds to compete effectively in the political mar-
71. Id. at 3405.
72. The 1976 amendments gave political action committees great and
unusual powers in comparison to either candidates or individuals: Political
action committees are unlimited in the total amounts of money they re-
ceive, expend, and contribute to candidates. To vest such extraordinary
power in political action committees, without some reasonable limits such
as section 441a(a)(1)(C) on how they can collect money, would be to cre-
ate novel and potentially enormous opportunities for corruption. As one
study has concluded, even as limited by section 441a(a)(1)(C), political
action committees have become vast, unaccountable, and low visibility cen-
ters of electoral influence that effectively detach candidates from their
nominal geographic constituencies. See Institute of Politics, John F. Ken-
nedy School of Government, Harvard University, An Analysis of the Im-
pact of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 1972-78, Prepared for the
House Comm. on House Admin., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (Comm. Print
1979) ....
No. 79-4426, slip op. at 3377.
73. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
74. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
1 5:1981
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ketplace with other more affluent individuals capable of huge personal
expenditures. Considering the nature of the election at stake (ballot
measure versus candidacy), the referendum political committee will not
itself be making contributions, only expenditures to publicize its sup-
port or opposition to a concept, not a potentially corruptible candidate.
Thus, the referendum political committee serves as a mechanism for
effectively pooling expenditure capital for the purpose of first amend-
ment protected political expression.
Recognizing a first amendment right to make unlimited contribu-
tions to referendum political committees also serves an important pub-
lic interest: the public's right to hear. In Bellotti, the Supreme Court
emphasized that it was the nature of the speech proposed that com-
manded first amendment protection:75 "The Court has declared . . .
that 'speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is
the essence of self-government.' . . . And self-government suffers when
those in power suppress competing views on public issues 'from diverse
and antagonistic sources.'... 176 The Court also noted that "freedom
of expression has particular significance with respect to government be-
cause '[i]t is here that the state has a special incentive to repress oppo-
sition and often wields a more effective power of suppression.' ",7
Surely political communication regarding an issue of such governmen-
tal importance as to be the subject of a referendum goes to the "es-
sence of self-government" such that financial limitations on such ex-
pression would be in obvious violation of the fundamental purpose for
which the first amendment was historically intended.7 8
2. What State Interests Are "Compelling"?
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized two state interests
as sufficiently compelling to allow regulation of political contributions
and expenditures: preservation of (1) the integrity of the representative
75. See 435 U.S. at 776-77.
76. Id. at 777 n.12 (citations omitted).
77. Id. n.11.
78. For a discussion of the historical relationship between the first amendment
and the public discussion of governmental affairs, see T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GEN-
ERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966) and A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (both cited in Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
777 n.11).
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system of government and (2) the public's confidence in that system of
government.79 These interests have been expressed in various ways
("prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption,"' 0 ["pres-
ervation of] the integrity of the electoral process,"' ' ["sustaining] the
active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for
the wise conduct of government" 2), but the underlying principles re-
main the same. Of course, a mere assertion of these interests is insuffi-
cient if not inherently persuasive or supported by record or legislative
findings, or by Supreme Court precedents. 83
79. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
80. Id. at 25.
81. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788.
82. Id. at 788-89 (citing United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567,
575 (1957)).
83. See Bellotti as quoted in text accompanying note 52 supra.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court relied on legislative findings to constitutionally
support the Federal Election Campaign Act's $1,000 limitation on contributions to
candidates:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure political quid pro quo
from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of represen-
tative democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices
can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after
the 1972 election [in the Watergate. investigations] demonstrate that the problem
is not an illusory one.
424 U.S. at 26-27 (footnote omitted). See also note 1, supra.
In striking down the Act's $1,000 limitation on independent expenditures in sup-
port of a candidate, the Court made no reference to any record or legislative findings or
Supreme Court precedents supporting the limitation and apparently found arguments
advanced by the Act's proponents inherently unpersuasive:
The parties defending §608(e)(1) [limiting expenditures] contend that it is nec-
essary to prevent would-be contributors from avoiding the contribution limita-
tions by the simple expedient of paying directly for media advertisements or for
other portions of the candidate's campaign activities. They argue that expendi-
tures controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and his campaign might
well have virtually the same value to the candidate as a contribution and would
pose similar dangers of abuse. Yet such controlled or coordinated expenditures
are treated as contributiods rather than expenditures under the Act. Section
608(b)'s contribution ceilings rather than §608(e)(1)'s independent expenditure
limitation prevent. . . [such] disguised contributions. . . . Unlike contributions,
such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candi-
date's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prear-
rangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate. . . not only
17
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Is there any basis for finding a compelling state interest in limiting
contributions in the referendum political committee context which
would justify infringement on contributors' first amendment rights of
political expression and association? In both Let's Help Florida" and
Berkeley,85 the proponents of the regulations limiting such contribu-
tions stressed their importance in preventing corruption and promoting
disclosure of the identity of campaign contributors, two variations on
the integrity of the system/public confidence theme. Although the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Let's Help Florida followed Bellotti
in concluding that, with regard to referendum elections, statutory re-
strictions upon political contributions cannot be justified as a means for
preventing political corruption because there are no candidates to be
corrupted,86 the Supreme Court of California in Berkeley merged the
integrity of the system/public confidence interests to define the corrup-
tion to be guarded against as the corruption of the purpose of the initi-
ative/referendum mechanism itself and the electoral process in gen-
eral.8 7 The California court relied heavily on "[c]ommentators on our
political scene"88 to find a trend toward loss of confidence in the politi-
cal system and apathy in elections which limitations on contributions to
referendum political committees might reverse by "assuring the voters
that their vote and their participation, whether in the form of money or
services, are significant" 89 and concluded that this interest, served by
the ordinance, should be recognized as compelling."
undermines the value of the expenditures to the candidate, but also alleviates the
danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commit-
ments from the candidate.
424 U.S. at 46-47 (footnote omitted).
Likewise, in Bellotti, the Court found that the state's assertion that there is danger
in allowing corporate participation in the discussion of a referendum issue rested upon
the unsupported assumption that "such participation would exert an undue influence on
the outcome of a referendum vote and,-in the end-destroy the confidence of the
people in the democratic process and the integrity of government." 435 U.S. at 789.
84. See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
86. 621 F.2d at 199-200.
87. 27 Cal. 3d at -, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
88. Id. at , 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
89. Id. at _. 614 P.2d at 747-48, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
90. Id. at _ 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
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Will the United States Supreme Court agree? Bellotti ("[t]he risk
of corruption perceived in candidate elections. . . simply is not present
in a popular vote on a public issue"91) indicates a negative answer, not-
withstanding the distinction drawn between the statute in Bellotti and
the ordinance in Berkeley by the California court: "[tihe statute at
issue in Bellotti totally prohibited. . expenditures and contributions;
the Berkeley ordinance . . . permits contributions . . . in amounts up
to $250.1192 This distinction does not take into account the fact that the
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act found unconstitu-
tional in Buckley were financial limitations, not prohibitions. Thus,
particularly if the previously advanced principle is accepted-that con-
tributions to referendum political committees, like Bellotti's referen-
dum expenditures, are pure speech political expression which cannot be
dollar-limited according to Buckley-the Berkeley explanation of Bel-
lotti creates a distinction without a difference under the first
amendment.
Even assuming that restoring public confidence in the political sys-
tem and stemming voter apathy are compelling anti-corruption inter-
ests, "[iut is noteworthy that it [was] not the.fact of a danger but the
potential of a danger that alone generates the compelling interest
found by the majority [in Berkeley]."" Thus, Justice Richardson, dis-
senting, criticized the Berkeley majority for basing its finding of a com-
pelling state interest on a "wholly untested political hypothesis [which
was] not based upon any record but rather upon the opinions and con-
clusions of 'commentators on our political scene,' 'a political scientist,'
[and] a 'student of the California initiative process.' 94 Justice Rich-
ardson continued:
The rationale for the ordinance's restrictions, viewed as sufficient by
the majority, is the danger of "corruption" of the initiative process
through this infusion of unlimited sums of money by "large contributors"
...favoring or opposing a ballot measure. This, the majority argues,
will destroy the electorate's "confidence in our political system.". . . In
the absence, however, of some affirmative showing "by record or legisla-
91. 435 U.S. at 790 (citations omitted).
92. 27 Cal. 3d at _, 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
93. Id. at , 614 P.2d at 751, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (emphasis in original).
94. Id.
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tive finding" this precise reasoning, central to the majority opinion, was
flatly rejected, as to corporate contributors, by the Bellotti court . . . in
these words: "[T] here has been no showing that the relative voice of cor-
porations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing refer-
enda in Massachusetts or that there has been any threat to the confi-
dence of the citizenry in government." Similarly, there has been "no
showing" whatever that large contributors, corporate or otherwise, have
thwarted or perverted the initiative in California, which at present ap-
pears to be alive and well and increasingly used.95
Accordingly, even if the California court's definition of "corruption" in
the referendum context gains acceptance, it is possible the Supreme
Court will not find that the Berkeley ordinance serves a proven compel-
ling anti-corruption interest.
3. What Form of Regulation is Most Effective and Least
Restrictive?
Clearly, one of the most effective means of protecting the political
process from the corruption of money is to place ceilings on contribu-
tions and expenditures of all kinds. But because of the fundamental
first amendment implications of such ceilings, the test for the validity
of those measures is not whether they are the most effective means of
protecting against corruption but whether they are the least restrictive
method of effectively accomplishing that end, "closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgment""6 of first amendment rights.
Accepting the notion that referendum elections do not present the
same opportunities for quid pro quo corruption as candidacy elections,
and thus limitations on contributions to referendum political commit-
tees unnecessarily infringe on first amendment rights, does not preclude
some other form of regulation. For example, in Let's Help Florida the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal recognized Florida's disclosure laws as
effective against corruption of the initiative/referendum process, since
they allow the public an opportunity to evaluate the merits of a ballot
measure with knowledge of its supporters and opponents.97 The protec-
tion of the electoral system afforded by disclosure measures is not abso-
95. Id. at -, 614 P.2d at 752, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
96. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
97. See 621 F.2d at 200-01.
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lute, however. The information made public is just that-information.
It is the responsibility of the voter to use this data in conjunction with
other information about an issue to make a reasoned decision.
In contrast, the Supreme Court of California regarded the Berke-
ley disclosure provision as too little, too late, to allow the public reason-
able opportunity to use facts made public by disclosure to make ra-
tional decisions.9 8 Interestingly, the Berkeley ordinance required
newspaper publication (twice during the last seven days of a referen-
dum campaign) of contributor information,9" whereas the Florida law
required mainly reporting of financial information to the Secretary of
State (which information then became public record).' °0
Are disclosure laws like those on the books in Florida and Berke-
ley, California, sufficiently effective against corruption of the referen-
dum process? The answer cannot be objective. In the final analysis it
must be tied to the basic political philosophy of those asked to respond.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's attitude toward the Florida disclo-
sure requirement reflects a more conservative view of the relationship
between a citizen and his/her government than that held by the Su-
preme Court of California. Even though the* California court may be
correct in its observation that "inducements are disseminated and voter
impressions are formed substantially before the sources of committee
financing are revealed,"101 should one citizen's participation in the po-
litical process be sacrificed to another citizen's political naivete'?
Stated another way, to what lengths should government go to see to it
that citizens fully inform themselves before making political decisions?
In light of the first amendment implications of limiting contributions to
referendum political committees, a more constitutionally acceptable
method of improving public awareness would be to rewrite the disclo-
sure laws, a task which the Supreme Court can happily note falls to the
legislatures, not the courts.
CONCLUSION
It would be easy to succumb to the symmetry of upholding limita-
98. See 27 Cal. 3d at , 614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
99. Id. at , 614 P.2d at 753, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
100. See FLA. STAT. §§ 106.03, .07 (1977).
101. 27 Cal. 3d at , 614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
1 5:1981
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tions on political contributions while striking down limitations on politi-
cal expenditures without regard to the nature of the election at stake
(referendum versus candidacy) or, in the case of contributions, the
identity of the recipient (political committee versus candidate or candi-
date's campaign organization). But the stringent demands of the first
amendment on those who would seek to balance its protections against
state interests do not permit such unsophisticated treatment.
If the Supreme Court overrules the California court on the theory
that there is no risk of corruption in the referendum context, the valid-
ity of disclosure laws in that setting must be questioned. (If they do not
act as anti-corruption measures, what compelling state interest do dis-
closure laws serve?) If the Court accepts the California court's defini-
tion of "corruption" in connection with ballot measures (corruption of
the process), the integrity of disclosure laws will be preserved; but if
the Court goes the second mile and recognizes contribution limitations
as a valid method of avoiding that corruption, a precedent requiring a
case-by-case analysis of contribution limitations will be established, ne-
cessitating inquiry in each instance as to whether there was a demon-
strable threat to the referendum process which required legislative ac-
tion limiting contributions to political committees.
Recognizing contributions to referendum political committees as
pure speech political expression establishes neither the "no risk of cor-
ruption" precedent nor the "case-by-case corruption of the process"
precedent but does create other problems including the question of the
validity of limitations on contributions to candidate political action
committes, which the Court may resolve in California Medical Associ-
ation v. Federal Election Commission,10 2 and the issue of the validity
of limitations on contributions to political committees supporting both
candidates and ballot measures. Nonetheless, this appears to be the
most desirable judicial approach because it would preserve funda-
mental first amendment rights while leaving legislative bodies free to
impose reasonable disclosure requirements and other protections
against abuse of the referendum process.
Perhaps this discussion demonstrates that the Supreme Court's
resolution of the conflict between the first amendment and election
102. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
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finance laws can still be only piecemeal at best, notwithstanding the
Court's best efforts in Buckley and Bellotti. Nonetheless, the yearning
for one final blueprint still lingers, especially in the souls of advisors to
Congressional, state, and local lawmakers.
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